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We reconsider in this paper the alleged implausibility of Ghosh’s model and we do so 
reformulating the model to incorporate an alternative closure rule. Our proposed closure 
rule is in line with the original allocation rules defined by A. Ghosh. The closure solves, 
to some extent, the implausibility problem that was pointed out by Oosterhaven for then 
value–added is correctly computed and responsive to allocation changes resulting from 
supply shocks. Some numerical examples illustrate the sectoral and aggregate 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
  The debate on the validity and plausibility of the so called ‘supply-driven’ input-
output model of Ghosh (1958) seems to keep resurfacing every so often. The difficulty 
to interpret Ghosh’s model within conventional production theory has led to numerous 
interpretations and assertions that, periodically, put into question the structure and 
meaning of the model. Giarratani (1980), for instance, discussed the lack of well 
understood economic behaviour behind it.  Oosterhaven (1988, 1989), in turn, called the 
attention over the ‘implausibility’ of a model that allocates output in response to 
changes in value–added in a given sector without those changes in output translating 
into further changes in value–added. In whatever way output turns out to be produced 
and allocated among sectors it surely makes little sense that value–added is not 
responsive to a general system reallocation. Gruver (1989), however, argues in favour 
of the plausibility of the model provided only small changes are considered. In turn, 
Dietzenbacher (1997) ‘vindicates’ Ghosh by way or reinterpreting it as a price model, 
which then happens to be fully and formally equivalent to Leontief’s price model and 
we are back to the well-known and standard interindustry model.  More recently De 
Mesnard (2009a, 2009b) has claimed the model to be uninteresting since it is 
implausible as an output model, unnecessary as a price model and less informative than 
Leontief’s dual quantity and price models. More in-depth discussion and details can be 
found in the references provided by these authors but the essence of the problematic 
issues about Ghosh’s model has been sufficiently laid out.  
  Our aim in this paper is reviewing and addressing the ‘plausibility’ debate 
regarding unresponsive value-added that was pointed out by Oosterhaven (1988, 1989). 
His sharp criticism is valid since value–added being unresponsive to output changes is a 
hard to sell economic fact. Under Ghosh’s model conditions, suppose that value–added 







 in sector j, say, increases. When this shock is subsequently absorbed by the output 
allocation system, we observe an increase in the output of sector i ( ij ) ≠ , as a result of 
the endogenous output reallocation, but at the same time value–added in sector i is 
surprisingly unaffected. Needless to say this seems to violate common sense as well as 
some version of Debreu’s axiom on the impossibility of the Land of Cockaigne 
(Debreu, 1959, chapter 3).  
Let us consider for a moment Leontief’s open quantity model (Leontief, 1936). 
When autonomous final demand for good j increases, the system generates increases in 
output and value–added in all sectors. There is more value–added around but this does 
not have, however, any effect whatsoever in final demand for other goods  . This 
is also somewhat surprising as far as economic logic goes. How can it be that 
consumption behaves in an unresponsive way to the new additional income? There are 
at least two ways out of this situation. The first one is to close Leontief’s open model 
and make consumption endogenous using linearity assumptions. The second one is to 
move up from the input-output model towards general equilibrium models where 
consumption is endogenous and price and income responsive. If Ghosh’s model is not 
‘plausible’ because value–added is unresponsive to output reallocations, then a similar 
case could be made for Leontief’s model being somewhat ‘implausible’ too because of 
the fact that consumption is unresponsive to income generation, which is also a rather 
peculiar behavior. 
( ) ij ≠
This having been said, perhaps the road to endow Ghosh’s model with a bit more 
plausibility is formally similar to the road taken with Leontief’s model: close it with an 
additional layer of endogeneity. If for Leontief we make the ‘driving demand’ force 
(consumption) endogenous, then for Ghosh we may attempt to make the ‘driving 
supply’ force (value–added) endogenous. Since Ghosh’s model shares the basic 







 mathematical linearity of the standard interindustry model, closing it may follow the 
same formal logic. We first need a rule stipulating a relationship between value–added 
and some output measure which is allocation compatible and, secondly, we need an 
instrument that reflects and captures external supply shocks that are subsequently 
incorporated into the allocation system. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we extend Ghosh’s model by 
formulating an alternative closure rule for solving the aforementioned lack of value-
added responsiveness. In our view, this closure rule follows the original allocation rules 
more properly than previous work. Davis and Salkin (1984), for instance, make value-
added endogenous using the Leontief perspective of input coefficient rather than 
Ghosh’s output coefficient idea. We verify the consequences of the proposed closure 
rule for a correct accounting of output changes as well as value–added changes. We 
then illustrate the results with some numerical examples in Section 3 which show that 
the allocation system is consistent both at the sectoral and aggregate levels. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. CLOSING GHOSH’S MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
  Ghosh himself (1958) formulated his model as a vision of two quite different 
economic scenarios, one referring to capitalist economies with producers having 
monopolistic power, and therefore control of the supply, another referring to non-
market economies with a central planner whose mission is to allocate output among the 
intervening agents. In both cases, the connecting formal aspect is the fact that supply 
may be subject to restrictions and under the control of some exogenous agent. 
Furthermore, in both interpretative cases the implausibility pointed out by Oosterhaven 







 still stands. Because of the recent fundamental advances of industrial organization 
theory, we believe Ghosh’s approach is way too simplistic and restrictive as a sensible 
tale for a monopolistic approach even in a disaggregated setting
1. We will therefore 
approach the lack of plausibility issue using the context of a non-market economy as the 
basic storyline. In this setting we will assume that decisions on output allocation are 
taken by a benevolent central planner whose assigned task is to enhance the collective 
good and guarantee a viable distribution of goods. This alleged economy comprises n 
productive units and distinguishes a private agent (citizens) and a public one (the 
planner). The private agent provides labour services to all sectors and in exchange 
receives income (value–added) that is used to finance his consumption needs and his 
contribution to the sustainment of the collective. From this contribution the planner 
provides infrastructure services that are used in the allocation process. These services 
also provide value to the collective, which is in turn used by the public agent to 
facilitate goods to society in the form of public goods. The aggregate level of these 
public goods is of course constrained by the overall contributions to the collective
2.  
Let us begin considering a reference or benchmark allocation table for this n good-n 
sector economy. The reference data in value flows for such an economy is represented 
in Table 1. Data in this Table represent an economic arrangement that is allocation 
feasible in the aggregate as well as budget feasible for all agents involved. All 




                                                 
1 See Nikaido (1975) for a disaggregated approach to monopolistic power and Tirole (1988) for a state of 
the art in industrial organization. 
2 In a market economy these citizens’ contributions would take the form of taxes and the return to society 
would of course be labelled as public consumption and investment.  








Table 1: Benchmark allocation data
   Sector 1   Sector 2  ...  Sector n 
Private 
Agent Collective   Total 
Sector 1  z11 z12 ...  z1n f1 c1   x1
Sector 2  z21 z22 ...  z2n f2 c2   x2
  .... ... ... ...  ...   ...  ...     ... 
Sector n   zn1 zn2 ...  znn  fn  cn    xn
           
Value-added v1 v2 ...   vn     
Collective  t1 t2 ...   tn     
           
Total   x1 x2 ...  xn     
 
Because of viability the following accounting identities hold true: 
1
    ( 1,2,..., )
n
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++= = ∑        ( 2 )  
In Expressions (1) and (2) we have that zij is the amount of good i flowing to sector 
j, fi is the consumption of good i by the private agent, ci is collective consumption of 
good  i,  vj is income accruing to the private agent in sector j whereas tj is the 
materialization of the contribution to the collective. The identity in expression (1) 
shows, by rows, the ‘output’ distribution for each of the goods in terms of gross output 
xi. Using columns, identity (2) shows the ‘input’ repercussions of the said output 
allocations that are budget feasible. Because of a ‘Walras-like’ aggregate feasibility 
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 The left-hand side of (3) can be interpreted as national output calculated from the 
expenditure side. The right-hand side, in turn, is national output as obtained from the 
income side. Alternatively, if the private and public agents behave so as to satisfy some 

















          ( 4 )  
then the national output accounting identity (3) follows from aggregation of the budget 
constraints in (4).  
In matrix terms the input-output data information in Table 1 takes this shape: 
⋅++= Ze f c x                          ( 1 ’ )  
'' ' ⋅++= eZ v t x '                          (2’) 
where e is a summation vector. The rest of the notation with matrix Z, column vectors f, 
c and  , and row vectors ,   and   is self-explanatory. Let us consider now the 
matrix   of ‘allocation’ coefficients, that is to say, the information on how output is 
sectorally distributed among productive agents: 
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BX Z                          (5) 
The notation  stands for the diagonalised version of vector   while   is the 
inverse matrix of  . Solving for Z in Expression (5) and substituting in identity (2’) we 
obtain now an equation in  : 
ˆ X x
1 ˆ − X
ˆ X
x'
ˆ '' ' ' ' ' ' ' ⋅++=⋅⋅++=⋅++= eZ v t eXB v t x 'B v t x '               (6) 







 This equation corresponds to the familiar ‘supply-driven’ equation of Ghosh and 
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We will now postulate a possible closing for value-added. Define the coefficient  i λ  
as value-added per unit of aggregate consumption. This coefficient expresses, in 
normalized terms, the value-added contribution in each sector i required for a unit of 
private consumption to be available
4. Note that this coefficient might also be considered 
as an allocation coefficient for value-added. However,  i λ  follows allocation rules in 
terms of final private consumption rather that overall output levels. Define too dj as the 
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=⋅ ⋅ ∑ j x
                                                
                ( 9 )  
so that in compact matrix terms (9) becomes: 
 
3 B is non-negative, productive and (I-B) is singular. See Waugh (1950). Also, (I-B)
-1 can be expressed as 
a convergent matrix series. 
4 Recall that in Leontief’s standard closed model consumption is made endogenous in terms of labor 
requirements. The closure rule in (8) can therefore be seen as reciprocal to the one used in Leontief’s 
case. 


























⋅             (10) 
where the matrix  ' ⋅ λ d  reflects the value-added allocation coefficients that derive from 
the private agent consumption. Observe too that the coefficients () ij d λ ⋅  in this matrix 
are fully consistent with the allocation coefficient idea proposed by Ghosh and they are 
the basis for making sectoral value-added endogenous and quantity responsive. When 
matrix  is post-multiplied by vector x, we obtain scalable value-added in response 
to changes in output levels, which in turn are driven by the exogenous changes in the 
value contributed to the collective, i.e. t.  
' ⋅ λ d
We now incorporate expression (10) into (7) via its transpose to obtain: 
' ' '' ' ' '' =⋅++=⋅+⋅ ⋅+ xx B v tx B x d λ t                              (11) 
We can now solve again for   under this additional assumption to find:  ' x
()
1 '' '
− =⋅ −−⋅ xt I B d λ                        (12) 
The inverse matrix in Expression (12) can be interpreted as the ‘extended’ Ghosh 
inverse since it incorporates allocation coefficients for material flows, B, and value-
added flows,  . Supply shocks are caused by the exogenous actions of the central 
planner as represented by changes decreed in contributions to the collective,  , for 
example. The output vector   that satisfies condition (12) can be interpreted as an 
‘allocation equilibrium’ for this economy, and such an equilibrium turns out to be 
consistent with the allocation rules implicit in B
' ⋅ d λ
' ∆t
' x
  and  ' ⋅ d λ  and with the value of 
contributions to the collective, i.e.  . Allocated output is coherently distributed among  ' t







 sectors while at the same time it is value feasible. The new ‘equilibrium’ can be 
visualized in differential terms from:      
(
1 '' '
− ∆= ∆ ⋅−−⋅ xt I B d λ )            ( 1 3 )  
Provided the extended allocation matrix  ' + ⋅ Bd λ  is also productive, in the sense 
that   for all possible row vectors  , then the new ‘equilibrium’ 
defined in (13) might be also rewritten as a power series of the form: 
(' ) ' +⋅ ⋅ ≤ Bd λ xx ' '0 ≥ t
() () ()
2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ... ' ' ...
k ∆ =∆ +∆ ⋅ + ⋅ +∆ ⋅ + ⋅ + +∆ ⋅ + ⋅ + xt t B d λ tBd λ tBd λ  (14) 
 
Expression (14) indicates that the endogenous effect on output levels can be 
decomposed into the following components: the “pure” impact of the contribution to the 
collective that adds value to production, i.e.  ' ∆t . This “pure” impact in output should be 
allocated in the system in the form of intermediate and private final demand, i.e. 
 generating additional multiplicative effects in output levels. This 
“second-round” impact further increases production in the remaining sectors round by 
round according the structure of the “allocation path” defined in (14), i.e. 
 
( ' ∆⋅ + ⋅ tBd λ ) '
() ()
2 ' ' ... ' ' ...
k ∆ ⋅ +⋅ ++ ∆ ⋅ +⋅ + tBd λ tBd λ
Using the new output in the allocation equilibrium from expression (12) (or its 
differential version from (13)) it is straightforward to obtain a new and balanced Ghosh 
table using the technological information in matrices B and  ⋅ d λ', along with the 
allocation coefficients for private consumption dj from expression (8) and similarly 
constructed allocation coefficients for collective consumption (i.e.   using the 
benchmark data in Table 1). The new output level is fully consistent with the set of 
allocation rules and satisfies as well all the viability restrictions as described in 
expressions (1) and (2). 
/ j cX j







 4. CLOSING GHOSH’S MODEL: A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the formal description and interpretation of the closed Ghosh model 
presented in Section 3, we use now a numerical example. We start using a 3 sector, 3 
good economy whose reference data in value flows is shown in Table 2a.  
 
TABLE 2a: Reference data: Numerical example 
   Sector 1  Sector 2  Sector 3    Private Agent Collective   Total 
Sector 1  30 20 10   35  5    100 
Sector 2  20 10 40    5  25    100 
Sector 3  10 20  5   30  35    100 
               
Value-added  20 10 40          70 
Collective  20 40  5          65 
               
Total   100 100 100    70  65    
 
 
Let us assume now that this economic system has a benevolent central planner that 
decides to allocate additional resources to sector 1 in such a way that its value 
contribution increases by 1 unit of value. As an example, these additional exogenous 
resources decided by the central planner would be materialized in new equipment whose 
services could be used in sector 1 and that increases production levels either in value or 
quantity terms. This refers to what we have named the “pure impact” in Expression 
(14), i.e. . This impact additionally boosts output levels due to the multiplicative 
effects generated by this supply shock in the remaining sectors according to the 
structure of the allocation path in (14), i.e. if additional intermediate supply is allocated 
to the remaining sectors, there would be endogenous supply effects coming from these 
sectors that further affect the output values in sector 1 increasing overall value-added in 
' ∆t







 the system. By repeating the same decision in sectors 2 and 3 we can envision and 
compare the overall results in terms of the new allocation equilibria in Table 3. 
  
TABLE 3: Synthetic indicators after evaluating ∆ti=1 units sequentially in each 
sector. 
  % Endogenous Changes in “key” variables 
Exogenous 
    Shock 
∆v  ∆x1 ∆x2 ∆x3 ∆x 
∆t1 =1 unit   2.10   2.60   1.18   1.65   1.81 
∆t2 =1 unit   1.29   1.08   1.81   1.41   1.43 
∆t3 =1 unit    1.46   0.96  0.84   2.12   1.31 
 
As it can be asserted from Table 3, the impact of an identical unitary exogenous 
increase in the contribution from the collective is distributed in an unequal way, 
reflecting the distinct values of the allocation coefficients in each sector. If the flow is 
contributed to Sector 1, for instance, total value-added in all three sectors increases by 
2.10 percent and, on average, total output increases by 1.81 percent. Differently to the 
open version of the Ghoshian approach, value-added changes everywhere and does so 
simultaneously and homogeneously. The homogeneity of the endogenous change in 
value-added is due to the “allocation rules” as dictated by the matrix  . The set of 
Tables 2b-2d in the Annex show the readjusted allocation flows in sectoral detail. Note 
that each of the additional exogenous units contributed to each sector is fully and 
endogenously redistributed over collective consumption according to allocation rules. 
This is because, following the disciplined budget constraints defined in expression (4) 
of this closed version of the Ghoshian approach, the exogenous unit contributed from 
the central planner cannot be withheld by the private agent but rather devoted to 
collective consumption.  
' ⋅ d λ







 According to the simulation results presented in Table 3, if the benevolent central 
planner wished to maximise economy-wide effects, the contribution to the collective 
should be decreed in Sector 1. This is so because the implied reallocation effects, both 
in value-added and in output, are higher here than those obtainable should the 
contribution be allotted in Sectors 2 or 3.  
  These conclusions are independent from the benchmark value flows of the 
contribution to the collective. Consequently, there is no need to perform any 
normalization to appraise their robustness. Notice that the exogenous shock is carried 
out homogeneously in all three sectors and the impacts in Table 3 depict the percentage 
between benchmark and simulated allocations.   
These numerical examples of the closed Ghosh model outlined in Section 2 
approximate better, we believe, the initial idea posed by Ghosh. In his seminal work, 
this author highlighted that his approach could be used, in planned economies, for the 
assessment of economy-wide impacts of government employment programs. The main 
question that Ghosh wanted to address using his modelling proposal was the following: 
if the labour force is forcefully allocated in a given sector, what would the economy-
wide impact be according to the allocation rules that are used in planned economies?. 
The economy-wide output impacts of the open version of this model turn out not to be 
value feasible when answering this question (Oosterhaven, 1988). Our closed version, 
however, not only makes it possible to answer this question in a more plausible way but 
also helps in understanding the initial purposes of A. Ghosh. Needless to say, we were 
not attempting to propose here a complete theory of planning for centralized economies.  
 
 







 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper is simply to reconsider the initial purposes of A. Ghosh 
while trying to contribute to the extensive debate in the literature around his original 
model published in 1958. Since then, there has been an over-use of his model by 
researchers that, after some time, has given rise to an over-criticism.  
To this end we describe a way of closing the Ghoshian approach that resolves, to 
some extent, the implausibility problem that afflicts its open version (Oosterhaven, 
1988, 1989).  Supply shocks in this modified version of the Ghosh model stem from the 
actions of a benevolent central planner. This central planner exogenously contributes to 
production which will generate value to the economic system, applying it in one or 
more sectors. This initial impact is spread through the economic system further boosting 
output levels that, differently to the open version, are accompanied by simultaneous 
endogenous and allocation compatible increases in value-added. Therefore, our proposal 
for closing Ghosh’s model makes it more plausible.  
Lastly, we would like to include here a comment about duality (Oosterhaven, 1996). 
In our view we coincide with the conclusion of De Mesnard (2009a) in the sense that 
duality is not fulfilled under the original Ghoshian approach. Consequently, under the 
original Ghosh model, we have to know the ex-post changes in quantities, i.e. after the 
change in value-added has taken place, to identify the ex-post changes in prices. Note 
that in our alternative closed version of the Ghosh model, all changes are expressed in 
value terms and thus, duality is not accomplished as it is the case under the original 
open version of the Ghosh model (1958). 
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 ANNEX OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 2b: Simulated changes of the Reference data after evaluating an     
exogenous supply shock in Sector 1:  1 1 ∆ = t units of value. 
   Sector 1   Sector 2  Sector 3    Private AgentCollective   Total 
Sector 1  30.78 20.52 10.26  35.91      5.13  102.60 
Sector 2  20.24 10.12 40.47  5.06  25.29  101.18 
Sector 3  10.17 20.331  5.08  30.49  35.58  101.65 
           
Value-added  20.42 10.21 40.84       
Collective  21.00  40.00 5.00     
           
Total   102.60 101.18 101.65       
 
 
TABLE 2c: Simulated changes of the Reference data after evaluating an     
exogenous supply shock in Sector 2:  2 1 ∆ = t  units of value 
   Sector 1   Sector 2  Sector 3    Private AgentCollective   Total 
Sector 1  30.33 20.22 10.11  35.38      5.05  101.08 
Sector 2  20.36 10.18 40.72  5.09  25.45  101.81 
Sector 3  10.14 20.28  5.07  30.42  35.49  101.41 
           
Value-added  20.26 10.13 40.51     
Collective  2.00  41.00  5.00      
           
Total   101.08 101.81 101.41       
 
 
TABLE 2.d: Simulated changes of the Reference data after evaluating an     
exogenous supply shock in Sector 3:  3 1 ∆ = t  units of value. 
   Sector 1   Sector 2  Sector 3    Private AgentCollective   Total 
Sector 1  30.29  20.19  10.10  35.34    5.05  100.96 
Sector 2  20.17 10.08 40.34  5.04  25.21  100.84 
Sector 3  10.21 20.42  5.11  30.64  35.74  102.12 
          
Value-added  20.29  10.15  40.58     
Collective  20.00 40.00  6.00     
            
Total   100.96 100.84 102.12     
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